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The BP Report

Fifteen people died and more than 170 were injured in an explosion and fire at BP's Texas City refinery on March 23, 2005. Four months later, on July 28, 2005, a hydrogen fire that had the potential to cause additional deaths and injuries broke out at the Texas City refinery, resulting in a Level 3 community alert, followed by another Level 3 event on August 10. An 11-member Independent Safety Review Panel, headed by James A. Baker III, was called in to see what was going wrong.

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The panel's "Report of the BP U.S. Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel," released in January 2007, details in more than 300 pages how and why BP's corporate safety culture, safety management systems and corporate safety oversight at its U.S. refineries failed.

The report holds valuable lessons not just for BP, but all refinery, oil and gas, and chemical operations.

December 1, 2007

Copyright 2007© LRP Publications

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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